Team 13: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Analysis Support: Tunnel Detection System by Ugarte, Manuel A. et al.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications
2010-03
Team 13: U.S. Customs and Border




Team 13: U.S. Customs and Border Protection 




Thomas S. Anderson, Ph.D.










Since 1990, more than 116 cross-border subterranean tunnels 
have been discovered along the continental US borders, the 
vast majority between US and Mexico.  Tunnels present a 
low probability, high threat scenario to the United States and 
are a known means of illicit transportation of drugs, 
weapons, money and people across the US border. The 
perpetrators engaged in illicit trafficking are intelligent, 
tenacious, technologically innovative and they relentlessly 
seek to continue to expand their profitable enterprise. In 
today’s world, confronted with the realities of terrorism and 
terroristic objectives, one must also acknowledge that 
tunnels pose a looming threat to national security.   Tunnels 
are also a persistent military threat. A 2007 operational needs 
statement (ONS) from US Central Command (CENTCOM) 
noted that detainees were attempting to tunnel as a means to 
escape from the internment facilities.  Another region with 
an emerging subterranean threat to US Forces is in 
Afghanistan with the Karez, or underground aquifers built 
to move irrigation water from mountains to villages by 
normal gravity-driven flow.  The Karez in Afghanistan 
(thought to number 6,000) present the Taliban and other 
insurgents with a means to cache weapons and material, 
infiltrate and exfiltrate the battlefield and move fighters and 
supplies.   Furthermore, in Egypt, the flow of weapons, 
ammunition, and other contraband under the Egyptian 
border has contributed significantly to the ongoing Israeli-
Palestinian conflict.  Open source estimates place the number 
of tunnels along the Israel-Gaza border between 300 and 
1000. The US Army Corps of Engineers successfully 
answered the ONS from CENTCOM by developing and 
implementing the Tunnel Activity Detection System (TADS) 
(R2TD Implementation Directive). 
The objective of the TRADOC Analysis Center - 
Monterey (TRAC-MTRY) study is to determine the sensor 
system, to include the TADS, that maximizes the probability 
and efficiency of detecting existing tunnels and tunnel 
construction activity on the US border according to 
geographic location, infrastructure, and historical data. We 
used a systems engineering and analysis approach to 
determine the drug traffic organization’s (DTO) tunnel 
infiltration techniques on the Southern US border according 
to geographic location, infrastructure, and historical data.
This paper provides a  high level overview of the systems 
methodology and describes the initial effort conducted during 
the IDFW20 to implement an agent- base approach that will 
enable the analysis of tunnel detection systems. The 
methodology was comprised of using the functional 
decomposition of the tunnel threat to create a set of threads 
and vignettes for analyzing sensor type and allocation with 
agent-based modeling and simulation. The tunnel threat was 
based on a threat enterprise model of narcotics trafficking, 
coupled with global information systems (GIS) data. We 
evaluated information instances pertinent to tunnel threat 
behaviors to include historical tunnel locations, urbanization 
of border towns and tunnel attributes to support a strategy for 
equipping the border with a persistent tunnel defeat 
capability.
APPROACH TO THE TUNNEL DETECTION 
AGENT-BASED MODEL.
This research coalesces exploratory data analysis, 
analytical models, system engineering and analysis, and 
modeling and simulation to gain insights into sensor 
allocation, configuration, placement, and prioritization of 
sensor field emplacement along the US southern border. We 
applied operational analysis research methodologies to gain 
insights into these issues by evaluating the data and 
technologies available in order to enable a well informed 
recommendation for the system capabilities required to detect 
tunnels. The goals of Team #13 were: (a) develop a 
preliminary design of a prototype Tunnel Detection System 
asset allocation/trade-off analysis vignette in an agent-based 
model (ABS) modeling environment, (b) develop a data 
farming methodology that lends itself to ease of use for 
analysts and (c) identify and define appropriate system 
measures.
DESCRIPTION OF SCENARIO 
Given a generalized problem statement from the CBP, 
the physical domain of the problem was described and 
assessed.  The operative effort focuses on building scenarios. 
Scenario building helps stakeholders make strategic decision 
to adapt to their several possible futures. The focus is to 
identify the main driving forces and areas of uncertainty. 
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Based on this physical domain, the threats, CBP missions, and 
constraints of the system were used to develop a series of 
scenarios (a narrative description of possible future events) 
each exemplified by vignettes.  The vignettes (operational 
responses to the possible future events) were used to identify 
the system’s actor-driven use cases. The vignettes served as 
the baseline for diagramming various behaviors using the 
systems modeling language (SySML). The use case diagrams 
enable initial scenario development to begin through 
implementation of the system’s activity diagram, sequence 
diagrams, and functional and process decompositions, which 
aid in the construction of the system’s concept of operations. 
Next, the design parameters and factor levels affecting CBP’s 
sensor feedback and TTPs were identified.  The model will be 
translated into an executable agent-based model, where an 
appropriate experimental simulation design will be applied. 
The results of the simulation will be captured and analyzed in 
order to determine an appropriate sensor outlay and which, if 
any, specific tunnel interdiction TTPs should be implemented 
by CBP.  
The initial, overarching detection system use case 
diagram is depicted in Figure 1.  The overview CBP detection 
system of systems includes various human elements, 
networked sensor systems, and key data links between the 
internal system and external data sources.  
Figure 1. CBP Baseline Use Case.
After development of the baseline use case, the team 
applied a threat vignette (in this case, prosecution of a 
detected tunnel) to develop a sequence diagram depicting the 
process activities and functional actions of each of the relevant 
elements.  The sequence allowed for the development of an 
initial system concept of operations.  This CONOPS is 
summarized in the subsequent paragraph below.
A specific signature threshold is picked up by an array of 
underground sensors.  The observable measurements are 
transmitted to the sensor management station as well  as the 
Subject Matter Expert (SME) / Headquarters (HQ).  The SME 
may request more information from the sensors and the 
management station. Concurrently, the SME may also receive 
external information from other sources.  The sensors will 
respond to these requests and transmit additional parameters 
and observations to the SME. This data will include threat 
signature threshold, range, and position.
These observations allow the SME to further integrate 
and analyze the data and information.  Once the SME has 
evaluated and interpreted the data to indicate that a tunnel 
exists, he/she will notify the Site Investigation Team to 
investigate the situation further.  The Site Investigation Team 
is made up of four members.  Their job will be to conduct an 
area site survey of the specified location. Also, they will 
estimate the cost of the tunnel discovery, to include 
determining if and where a tunnel or cavity exits.  Once a 
tunnel is located, they will transmit their results to the SME/
HQ in addition to notifying the Interdiction Team that is 
comprised of a  Special Operations Team and Exploration 
Team. The Interdiction Team will investigate the specified 
location and drill a  series of holes using a 1” – 4” auger drill 
bit to verify the suspected location of the tunnel.  A larger 
bore will be implemented for ingress of robots or Special 
Operations teams for analysis and exploitation. They will 
determine the tunnel’s characteristics and type which will 
subsequently be transmitted to the SME. The SME will  direct 
to initiate tunnel closure actions by the Remediation Team. 
The team will fill the tunnel with an appropriate material (e.g. 
slurry substance or concrete) and will submit a tunnel closure 
report when complete.
In the case that the Site Investigative Team concludes 
that no tunnel is found, they will notify SME/HQ that no 
tunnel is found and flag the area and report a false alarm. 
The SME/HQ will develop a historical document trail for the 
area and note the region as a  “yellow” or potential hot region 
for continued or increased monitoring activity.  
Figure 2. Agent-based Model Scenario Concept Sketch.
Based upon these CONOPs, initial efforts were made at 
modeling the scenario in Pythagoras (an agent-based model 
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that is suited for data farming, execution of large numbers of 
repetitions of parametric runs to identify behaviors overlaid 
on a dynamic landscape). A concept sketch and screenshot of 
the base case scenario implemented in Pythagoras are shown 
in Figures 2 and 3, respectively.
Figure 3. Agent-based Approach in Pythagoras.
Design of Experiments 
The design of experiment (DOE) methodology will help 
us to gain insights on sensor system behavior and its 
interaction with key factors. Our goal  is to gain such insights 
from factors that influence the disruption of tunnel 
construction and use.  We will use Pythagoras, developed by 
Northrop Grumman, to represent tunnel detection and 
interdiction assets along a cross-border region of interest. 
During model development, we created notional factors 
(Table 1) that define both the characteristics and performance 
capabilities of the CBP sensor management system and the 
tunneling activities that it was designed to defeat. 
Our scenario consists of a region along the United States/
Mexico border with representative road and building 
infrastructure as previously depicted in Figures 2 and 3.  We 
will develop agents to represent the CBP system of systems 
(SoS) and threat as represented in Figure 1.  Agents will 
include team members, vehicles, and ground sensors that 
encompass the SME/HQ Fusion Center, Site Investigation, 
Interdiction, Special Operations, Exploration, and 
Remediation teams, and associated sensor networks.  The 
threat agents will consist of tunneling construction entities 
(digging and conveyance).  
Our specific design will capture the factors relevant to the 
CBP SoS.  Such factors include the type and number of sensors 
employed, sensor performance, configuration and field 
emplacement characteristics, the number and behavior of 
members in the CBP teams, as well as the characteristics of 
tunneling entities.
We anticipate that numerous factors consisting of 
multiple levels will be required to model the scenario. 
Employing a  full factorial experiment with the 23  factors 
presented in Table 1, each set at two levels (low & high), 
would result in 323 design points.  A pairwise projection for 
the first four factors of such a design is displayed in Figure 4. 
Fortunately, there are more efficient alternatives to using a full 
factorial design.
Figure 4. Scatterplot Matrix of a Factorial Design for Four Factors.
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Table 1. Notional Factors Representing the CBP Sensor 
Management System and Tunneling Activities.
The space-filling feature of Nearly Orthogonal Latin 
Hypercube (NOLH) enables efficient exploration of the 
solution space represented by measures of effectiveness 
(MOEs).  An NOLH experimental design will  facilitate a 
comprehensive analysis of potential  explanatory variables 
within our model.  Rather than being restricted to two or three 
levels, the analyst can create a design that uses multiple levels 
or even a continuous range of values for each factor.  
In addition to the space-filling property, orthogonal 
designs have no linear relationship between the regressors. 
The NOLH technique minimizes the correlation between 
factor columns, creating a nearly orthogonal design matrix. 
We can examine the off-diagonal elements within the 
correlation matrix of the design in order to measure the level 
of orthogonality.  
Using the NOLH designs spreadsheet tool developed by 
Professor Susan M. Sanchez at the Naval Postgraduate School, 
we generated 257 design points consisting of 23 factors.  Our 
preliminary design consists of a 257 x 23 matrix with the 
largest correlation of 0.089.
This design is displayed in Figure 5 which represents the 
space-filling, two-dimensional projections for the first four 
notional factors.
Figure 5. Scatterplot Matrix of NOLH Design for Four Factors.
SUMMARY 
Analysis of Base Case
The outputs of interest consist of the possible sensor 
system allocations for a given CBP concept of operation. The 
outputs are highly multivariate, consisting of all sensor 
systems positions, dispositions, and strengths as well as the 
perception of tunnel location. That is, the output is a  Common 
Operational Picture (COP) comprised of the adversary and/or 
CBP tunnel interdiction assets. The MOEs that may be derived 
from ABM include; time, assets and money allocation.  In this 
manner we determine the constraints that will  drive a future 
response.
Further Work 
The challenges to tunnel defeat are attributed to the vast 
lengths of the border, varied geologies that degrade persistent 
monitoring and geophysical resolution of subsurface 
anomalies, as well as the unknown quantity of existing 
tunnels. The tunnel denial and defeat mission must be 
addressed in a comprehensive manner in order to be 
successfully implemented. This means embracing a 
heterogeneous system of systems approach that allows both 
passive and active sensing, command and control, and 
robotics for post discovery interrogation. Before committing to 
a particular technical solution, a cost-benefit study and an 
analysis of systems study that takes into account operational 
performance associated with GIS locations, risk assessment 
associated with GIS location, man power requirements, 
projected training, maintenance costs, and sustainability 
factors will provide the necessary oversight and will 
demonstrate due diligence in specifying a system solution.
Within the context of systems engineering and analysis, 
agent-based modeling for tunnel detection systems shows 
great promise as a  method to enhance the evaluation of 
multiple detection systems under various conditions.  In 
addition, further work may include developing and testing a 
DOE capability and designing a user interface appropriate to 
the skill  level of the operator, the required response times, the 
resource allocations, and the operational environment. 
Improved automation of output analysis is also desirable, 
especially formatting the output reports to be more amenable 
for use by statistical packages for data analysis, evaluation, 
and assessment.
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